When it comes to
Introduction
Within the broad software engineering community, developers have made widespread use of object-oriented technology, including object oriented modeling, design, programming, and analysis, for well over a decade. New technologies, however, tend to make their way more slowly into a regulated environment. This is certainly true of OOT in commercial aviation applications. To date, few airbome computer systems in civil aviation have been implemented using OOT.
In the software engineering world, perhaps more so than many others, there is a constant stream of new development technologies. In a recent article, Robert Glass makes the following observation about acceptance of new software engineering concepts:
It is high time that we in the softwarefield questioned some of its old wives ' programs that have sought regulatory approval, so far, have been required to formulate issue papers to respond to certification concerns.
To foster dialogue and debate within the aviation s o h a r e community about OOT, the OOTiA project accomplished the following:
Established a web site dedicated to collecting data on safety and certification concems, httu://shemesb.larc.nasa. eov/foot/ Held public workshops to which the aviation software community was invited to discuss concerns Documented key concem and questions raised either through the web site or the workshops Developed guidelines to address the concerns Drafted an OOTiA handbook.
The OOTiA handbook' records the results of the above activities, and comprises 4 volumes: Volume 1 : Handbook Overview, Volume 2: Considerations and Issues, Volume 3: Best Practices, and Volume 4 Certification Practices.
The handbook is intended to be informational and educational, and does not represent official FAA policy or guidance.
Volume 2 of the handbook covers the concems and questions about OOT documented through special workshop breakout sessions and through the issue list on the OOTiA web site. Some of the results of the special workshop breakout sessions are reported in [6] . This paper focuses expressly on the part of Volume 2 that deals with the technical challenges to safe use of OOT in compliance with DO-l78B, as identified in the issue list. The purpose of this paper is not to provide in-depth coverage of the technical detail, but to raise general awareness of the subject matters that are a concem to safety and certification. The paper is structured as follows. First, the OOTiA issue list is briefly described. Next, the technical challenges to using OOT in a DO-178B context are presented. Finally, brief concluding remarks are made.
Organizing the OOTiA Issue List
aspects of OOT were collected on an issue list through the 00TiA web site. That list is available at httu://shemesh.larc.nasa.eov/foot/ootissues.html. To help consolidate the concems on the list, entries that expressed similar concems were grouped together. The groups were sorted according to the DO-178B life cycle process that is most influenced by that group to help provide a direct link to the guidance in DO-178B3. The software life cycle processes specified in DO-178B are In addition to these life cycle processes, section 12 of DO-l78B, titled Additional Considerations, provides guidance for ancillary topics such as tools, previously developed software, and formal methods. Because 00 tools were the main topic of a number of the entries, Addition Considerations seemed like a reasonable fourth category for organizing the list. mapped into one of the categories (Planning Process, Development Processes, Integral Processes, or Additional Considerations). For each category, technical challenges relevant to DO-178B were derived from the issues mapped to that category. The following sections describe the technical challenges within each category.
To support the discussion, entries from the issue list are cited and denoted by their tracking number &om the OOTiA web site. For example, E 1 is the first entry to the issue list, so (E 1) will Each comment recorded on the issue list was ' The current expectation is that the FAA will release the appear directly after the citation of that issue. It is important to note that mentioning an entry from the issue list does not imply its validity; some readers likely will dispute the validity of individual entries. The purpose of citing the entries is to give an account of the data that was collected, and show the basis for the challenges discussed within that category. The technical challenges, not the individual issues, are what is important.
Challenges for the Planning Process
the development and integral process activities, environment, and standards for a project. Planning decisions about how OOT will be used to meet the DO-178B objectives are recorded in documents such as the Plan for S o h a r e Aspects of Certification, Software Development Plan, and integral process plans. The challenges identified for the planning process involve life cycle data, requirements, and standards.
The planning process in DO-178B specifies
Defining Life Cycle Datu
OOT introduces new notations and models, such as behavior and implementation diagrams (use cases, class, sequence, component, deployment, activity, and statechart diagrams), that do not map directly to the data indicated for requirements, design, and code in DO-1 78B. A description of the software life cycle data is typically included in the Plan for Software Aspects of Certification, as discussed in section 1 I.le ofDO-178B. Some of the entries from the issues list (IL 77 and 87) specifically questioned how low level requirements, design, and source code would be defined for an 00 program. Determining how the life cycle data om an 00 development process maps to the life cycle data specified in DO-178B section 11 is a non-trivial challenge.
Requirements Methods and Notations
Another challenge for planning relates specifically to requirements methods and notations. Standards for software requirements, as described in 11.6 of DO-l78B, define the methods, rules, notations, and tools for developing high-level requirements. The challenge here lies in determining whether 00 approaches to requirements definition (Unified Modeling Language, UML, for example) are adequate for all types of requirements. Issue list entries covered two specific areas: (I) concem about adequately capturing non-functional requirements (E 7 9 , including performance requirements (IL 80); and (2) concern about the tendency in OOT to group requirements in a graphical format-possibly making identification of low-level requirements and derived requirements difficult, and complicating safety assessment (IL 79).
Restrictions
restrictions. Section 4 . 5~ of DO-178B states, "the software development standards should disallow the use of constructs or methods that produce outputs that cannot be verified or that are not compatible with safety-related requirements" [4] . Some 00 languages have features that can make it extremely difficult or impossible to satisfy the objectives of DO-178B. In such cases, coding standards might be necessary to specify a well-defined subset of the programming language that will allow compliance with objectives. Multiple inheritance is one controversial feature discussed in the issue list (E 38) that may require restriction. The challenge is to determine what restrictions and rules on language features, such as multiple inheritance, are warranted for a given software level.
The final topic relevant to planning deals w i t h
Challenges for Development Processes
or affect development processes (requirements, design, code, and integration). Many of these comments describe ways that 00 features promote complexity and ambiguity in the requirements, design, and code, potentially making the two assurance principles in DO-178B (assurance of intended functionality and assurance of no unintended functionality) difficult to meet. Sections 6.3.1 and 6.3.2 of DO-178B describe objectives for ensuring that high and low-level requirements are accurate, unambiguous (written in terms that only allow a single interpretation), and consistent.
Over 40 of the issues on the list are related to
10.C.2-3
Challenges related to subtypes, subclasses, memory management and initialization, and dead and deactivated code were identified. Subtype Requirement: Let Rx) be a property provable about objects x of type T.
Submes
Then Ry) should be true for objects y of type S where S is a subtype of T.
In theory, conformance to this principle would satisfy the assurance dilemma. However, in practice, this is difficult because the semantics of real programming languages differ considerably from the simple model used in [7] , and estahlishing the subtype relation may require verification (formal proof) beyond traditional (DO-178B-type) testing. 
Subclasses
Just as with types, hierarchies of classes can be constructed where subclasses are created from more abstract superclasses. A subclass automatically inherits all of the visible attributes and operations of the superclass; but can override inherited operations and add new attributes and operations. Ambiguity is a major concem.
Unclear Intent
With multiple inheritance, a subclass may have more than one superclass, so the same operation may be inherited from multiple sources. In these cases, the intent of the operation at the subclass level might not be clear. Cuthill notes that overuse of inheritance, particularly multiple inheritance, can lead to unintended connections among classes [8] . The key concem is that the original intent for a subclass or operation may not be clear. Examples of specific concems about unclear intent from the issue list include:
When the same operation is inherited by an interface via more than one path through the interface hierarchy (repeated inheritance), it may be unclear whether this should result in a single operation in the subinterface, or in multiple operations. (E
27)
A subclass may be incorrectly located in a hierarchy because the complete definitioniintention of a class may not he clear. (IL21) When a subinterface inherits different definitions of the same operation (as a result of redefinition along separate paths), it may be unclear whetherhow they should he combined in the resulting subinterface. (IL 28) Top-heavy multiple inheritance and very deep hierarchies (six or more subclasses) are error-prone, even when they conform to good design practice. The wrong variable type, variable, or method may he inherited, for example, due to confusion about a multiple inheritance structure. (IL 24) Overriding Ovemding is the redefinition of an operation or method in a subclass. Unintentionally overriding an operation is easy in some 00 languages because of the lack of restrictions on name overloading (the use of the same name for different operators or behavioral features, operations or methods, visible within the same scope). The consequence is that a method of the expected name but of a different type might be called in a program. It is important that the overriding of one operation by another and the joining of operations inherited from different sources always be intentional rather than accidental. (IL 32)
O&tt has identified five classes of errors associated with ovemding [9] . 
Memory Management and Initialization
Memory management involves making accessible the memory needed for a program's objects and data structures from the limited resources available, and recycling that memory for reuse when it is no longer required. According to section 11.10 DO-l78B, the software design data should discuss limitations for memory and the strategy for managing memory and its limitations. "The basic problem in managing memory is knowing when to keep the data it contains, and when to throw it away so that the memory can be reused. This sounds easy, but is, in fact, such a hard problem that it is an entire field of study in its ownright" [lo] .
Indeterminate Execution Profiles One problem with memory allocators is that regardless of the allocation algorithm used, allocating and deallocating memory repeatedly leads to fragmentation. Some algorithms, of course, lead to more fragmentation than others. In any case, periodic reorganization of memory is needed to reduce hgmentation. The problem is that many traditional allocation and deallocation algorithms are unpredictable in terms of their worst-case memory use and execution times, resulting in indeterminate execution profiles (IL 66). In a DO-178B context, understanding the worst-case is important.
Initialization
In 00 programs, class hierarchies (deep hierarchies in particular) may lead to initialization problems. Sections 6.3.4 and 6.4.3 of DO-I78 address incorrect initialization of variables and constants. A potential problem is that a subclass method might be called (via dynamic dispatch) by a higher level constructor before the attributes associated with the subclass have been initialized. (IL 19) Inadequate initialization can lead to the
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incomplete (failed) construction problem identified by Ofitt [9] . (IL 98) According to Ofhtt, there are two possible faults, depending on programming language: "First, the construction process may bave assigned an initial value to a particular state variable, but it is the wrong value. That is, the computation used to determine the initial value is in error. Second, the initialization of a particular state variable may bave been overlooked. In this case, there is a data flow anomaly between the constructor and each of the methods that will first use the variable after construction (and any other uses until a definition occurs)" [9] .
Dead or Deactivated Code
processes is dead and deactivated code. The glossary of DO-178B describes dead and deactivated code as follows:
The final area of concem for development "Dead code -Executable object code (or data) which, as a result of a design error cannot be executed (code) or used (data) in a operational configuration of the target computer environment and is not traceable to a system or sofiare requirement. An exception is embedded identijers" [4] .
"Deactivated code -Executable object code (or data) which by design is either (a) not intended to be executed (code) or used (data), for example, apart of apreviously developed software component, or (b) is only executed (code) or used (data) in certain configurations of the target computer environment, for example, code that is enabled by a hardware pin selection or software programmed options " [4] . Section 6.4.4.3 ofDO-178B requires that dead code be removed and analysis performed to assess the effect and need for reverification, and Section 5.4.3 of DO-178B requires deactivated code to be verified (analysis and test) to prove that it cannot be inadvertently activated.
In 00 programs, dead and deactivated code may be more common than in other style programs due to reuse of objects. In a reusable component, the requirements, design, and code might cover more functionality than required by the system being certified In a DO-178B context, there is a trade-off between the benefit of reuse and the cost of additional verification of deactivated code or removal of dead code.
Identifying Dead and Deactivated
Code The difference between &ad and deactivated code is not always clear when using OOT. Without good traceability, identifying dead versus deactivated code may be difficult or impossible. (IL 70) Dead or deactivated code can result when (a) methods of a class are not called in a particular application; (b) methods of a class are overridden in all subclasses; or (c) attributes of a class are not accessed in a particular application [ 111. For example, no instances of a superclass might be used if all of the subclasses override a particular method.
Libraries and Frameworks
Dependence on libraries is also a concem for safety-critical systems because it is often unclear what is happening in the object libraries. Libraries may not have been developed with safety-critical applications in mind and may not have the integrity required for such applications [12] . Deactivated code will be found in any application that uses general purposed libraries or object-oriented frameworks. (IL 1)-the challenge is to readily identify it.
systems. However, some might argue that dependence on libraries and frameworks may be more extensive in an 00 system. In any case, use of libraries must be carefully considered and verified for proper functionality.
This challenge applies equally well to non-00
Challenges for Integral Processes
the integral processes, just as they do for development processes. The entries from the issue list dealing with integral processes were partitioned into three categories: verification, configuration management, and traceability. Although traceability is not called out as an integral process in DO-l78B, it was categorized under integral processes because traceability data is often collected in conjunction with verification activities. The key challenges within each of the three categories are discussed below.
Complexity and ambiguity raise challenges for

Verification -Analysis
Verification, in the DO-178B context, examines the relationship between the software product and the requirements. The goal is to use reviews, analyses, and tests to detect and report errors introduced during the development processes. 00 techniques, especially dynamic dispatch and polymorphism, can complicate various verification activities required by DO-178B (IL 9). Program control flow can be difficult to predict (if it can be predicted at all) because polymorphism forces binding to be delayed until execution time. Execution-time circumstances can cause a single line of source code to mean many different thiigs depending upon specific data values that the program sees. For example, given a functionfix), whichfo to call depends on which class x belongs to, which might be multiple classes depending on the run-time state of the system. This is not a problem of doubt about a conditional statement-it is doubt about what a specific hnction call means because of dynamic dispatch [13]. This particular problem complicates testing and many different types of analyses including flow and coupling analysis, structural coverage analysis, and source to object traceability as discussed below.
Flow Analysis
Data and control flow analysis must be performed for software levels A-C to confirm data and control coupling between code components. 00 features tend to make data and control coupling relationships more complicated and obscure than in software developed using procedml languages. Dynamic dispatch complicates flow analysis, as described above, because it might be unclear which method in the inheritance hierarchy is going to be called. 00 design, in general, encourages the development of many small, simple methods to perform the services provided by a class. Determining the correctness of control flow decisions requires analysis of how individual data objects that control the execution flow of the software are created and maintained where and when are the objects created or destroyed, where and when are the values of the objects set, and how are any potential "shared data" conflicts controlled. The key concem here is that decision points can use data objects with values that are maintained in other parts of the software that might be remote from the proximate path of execution-making flow analysis difficult [14] .
OOT also encourages hiding the details of the data representation (that is, attributes) behind an abstract class interface. The commonly suggested best practice is that attributes of an object should be private, and access to them only provided through the methods appropriate to the class of the object. Being able to access attributes only through methods makes the interaction between two or more objects implicit in the code, complicating analysis.
Many of the relevant entries from the issue list expressed questions about how to do this analysis.
How can we meet the control and data flow analysis requirements of DO-178B with respect to dynamic dispatch? (IL Flow analysis, recommended for Levels A-C, is complicated by dynamic dispatch (just which method in the inheritance hierarchy is going to be called?). (IL 2) Flow analysis and structural coverage analysis, recommended for Levels A-C, are complicated by multiple implementation inheritance (just which of the inherited implementations of a method is going to be called and which of the inherited implementations of an attribute is going to be referenced?).
The situation is complicated by the fact that inherited elements may reference one another and interact in subtle ways which directly affect the behavior of the resulting system. (IL 16)
56)
00 language features such as inlining can also complicate flow analysis because inlining can cause substantial differences between the flow apparent in the source code and the actual flow in the object code.
Structural Coverage Analysis
Structural coverage analysis is required in DO-178B for software levels A-C. The intent of structural coverage analysis, in the DO-178B context, is to complement requirements-based testing by: (1) providing evidence that the code structure was verified to the degree required for the applicable software level; (2) providing a means to suppolt demonstration of absence of unintended functions; and, (3) establishing the thoroughness of requirements-based testing [15] .
Structural coverage analysis is complicated by dynamic dispatch because structural coverage changes when going from subclass to superclass. Structural coverage in an 00 program is not meaningful unless coverage measurements are context dependent; that is, based on the class of the specific object on which the methods were executed. "Coverage achieved in the context of one derived class should not be taken as evidence that the method has been fully tested in the context of another derived class'' [ 161. Inlining, templates, and code sharing were all identified in the issue list as impacting structural coverage analysis. A more detailed look at the effect of OOT on structural coverage is available in [17] .
Timing and Stack Analysis Timing analysis, worst-case execution time in particular, and stack usage are both part of review and analysis of source code in DO-178B section 6.3.4f. Stack overtlow errors are listed in section 6.4.3f of DO-178B as errors that are typically found in requirements-based hardware/software integration testing. Timing and stack analysis are complicated by certain implementations of dynamic dispatch. With some implementations of dynamic dispatch, it is difficult to know just how much time will be expended determining which method to call. Timing and stack analysis are also affected by inlining, templates, and macro-expansion. Inline expansion can eliminate parameter passing, which can affect the amount of information pushed on the stack as well as the total amount of code generated. This, in tum, can affect the stack usage and timing analysis.
Source to Object Trace Source to object code traceability tends to be a controversial issue; object orientation does not improve the situation. As discussed in DO-248B, for level A software, it is necessary to establish whether the object code is directly traceable to the source code. If the object code is not directly traceable to the source code, then additional verification should be performed [4] . Dynamic dispatch complicates source to object code traceability because it might be difficult to determine how the dynamically dispatched call is represented in the object code. (IL 6) In addition, source to object code correspondence will vary between compilers for inheritance and polymorphism, along w i t h constructors/destructors and other language helper functions. (E 12) Some 00 language features, such as inlining and implicit type conversion, can also complicate source to object code traceability. Inline expansion may not be handled identically at different points of expansion. This can be especially true when inlined code is optimized. (IL 46) Implicit type conversion raises certification issues related to source to object code traceability, the potential loss of data or precision, and the ability to perform various forms of analysis called for by DO-178B including structural coverage analysis and data and control flow analysis. It may also introduce significant hidden overheads that affect the performance and timing of the application. (IL 59)
Verification -Testing
Testing in DO-178B has two high-level objectives tied to the two fundamental assurance principles: demonstrating that the software satisfies its requirements, and demonstrating (with a high degree of confidence) that errors that could lead to unacceptable failure conditions have been removed (section 6.4 of DO-178B). According to Alexander, "object-oriented programs are generally more complex than their procedural counteqmts. This added complexity results from inheritance, polymorphism, and the complex data interactions tied to their use. Although these features provide power and flexibility, they increase complexity and require more testing" [18]. The topic of testing 00 programs is huge in scope with many books4 and considerable research devoted to the subject.
Issue list entries identified two general challenges with respect to testing: requirements testing and test case reuse. 
Requirements Testing
The first challenge goes back to the difference between the functional and object perspective. Three levels of tests are called out in DO-178B testing activities: low-level tests, software integration tests, and hardwarelsoftware integration tests. The challenge for requirements testing is that the mapping of function-oriented test cases to an object-oriented implementation might not be obvious, because the basic unit of testing in an 00 program is not a function or a subroutine, but an object or a class. Also, test coverage of high-level and low-level requirements will likely require different testing strategies and tactics fiom the traditional structured approach because information hiding and abstraction techniques decrease or complicate the observability of low-level functions.
Test Case Reuse
The second challenge area deals with the reuse of test cases or, more specifically, determining the appropriate reuse of test cases. Inheritance, dynamic dispatch, and ovemding complicate matters because it might be difficult to determine how much testing at a superclass level can be reused for its subclasses. 
Configuration Management
Although configuration management is addressed in only a few entries fiom the issue list, the comments are worth noting here because configuration management is an essential element of achieving regulatory approval. In DO-l78B, configuration identification and control involve defining what constitutes a configuration item, and defining processes for controlling (baselining and changing) those items. 
Traceability
Although traceability is not called out as a life cycle process in DO-l78B, traceability plays a large role in providing assurance of intended functionality and of the absence of unintended functionality. DO-178B guidelines require traceability between (a) system requirements and software requirements to enable verification of the complete implementation of the system requirements and give visibility to derived requirements; @) low-level and high level requirements to verify the architectural design decisions, give visibility to derived requirements, and demonstrate complete implementation of highlevel requirements; and (c) source code and lowlevel requirements to enable verification of the absence of undocumented source code and verification of the complete implementation of the low-level requirements (section 5.5 of DO-178B). Four areas of concern about traceability were identified in the issue list.
Function versus Object Tracing Traceability of functional requirements through implementation might be lost or difficult with an 00 program because of mismatches between function-oriented requirements and an object-oriented implementation (IL 61). The use of 00 methods typically leads to the creation of many small methods which are physically distributed over a large number of classes. This, and the use of dynamic dispatch, can make it difficult for developers to trace critical paths through the application during design and coding reviews. (IL
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69) Inheritance, polymorphism, and overloading exacerbate the problem by increasing the complexity of interaction among distributed objects.
Complexity
Another key concem for traceability is that class hierarchies, especially those constructed through multiple inheritance, can become overly complex. This complexity makes tracing functional requirements difficult, and can impact safety analysis. Current safety analysis is often based on determining that a function, as implemented, is both correct and safe. OOT complicates this analysis because the operations related to a function can be widely distributed throughout the objects, making the function difficult to trace.
Tracing Through 00 Views Traceability can also be affected by different graphical representations used in OOT. 00 requirements, design, and implementation might have multiple "views"; for example, the class diagram in the logical view. Traceability may get lost, or be made more difficult, because behavior of the classes and how they interact together to provide the required function might not be visible in any single view. Dynamic information conceming control flow or data flow might not be visible [19] .
Unfortunately, many current 00 tools do not currently provide a mechanism to trace requirements through multiple views and notations.
IL. 72 notes that traceability is made more difficult because there is often a lack of 00 methods or tools for the full software lifecycle.
Iterative Development Some 00 programs are developed through iteration. The risk of losing traceability may increase when using an iterative development process because of increased changes to development artifacts (E 107). Although this is certainly a traceability issue, this could also be considered when planning for the development process.
Challenges for Tools
Ten of the 103 issues on the issue list were categorized under Additional Considerations, with most of these being tool issues. Tool issues are a non-trivial part of compliance with DO-178B. DO-178B is concemed with identifying the tools that are used throughout the software life cycle, controlling those tools, and qualifying them. range of tools that support development and verification. Some 00 tools provide support for developing design and code through framework libraries of patterns, templates, generics, and classes, and also a framework to automatically generate source code from models. A fundamental question about 00 tools is whether the introduction of these tools in the development process contributes to the integrity of the software products or adds additional burden for verification. Two particular areas of concem regarding tools are: (1) long-term maintainability and maturity of tools and tool environments and (2) qualification.
Part of the claimed appeal of OOT is the wide
Tool Environments
DO-178B provides guidelines on software life cycle environment control in section 7.2.9 to ensure that tools that are used are properly identified, controlled and retrievable. An important concem about 00 tools is that the rapid rate of evolution of these tools may conflict with the needs of aviation software developers to support tools for relatively long periods of time. 
Tool Qualification
qualification is needed when processes in DO-178B are eliminated, reduced, or automated by the use of a software tool without its output being verified. Qualification requirements differ depending on whether a tool is a development tool (whose output is part of the software) or a verification tool (that cannot introduce errors, but might fail to detect them). Tools that automate the software development process are subject to more rigorous qualification requirements than those that automate verification processes.
The distinction between development tool and verification tool may not always be ciear for 00 tools, especially model-based tools. A challenge for qualification is whether new or different qualification criteria are needed for 00 specific tools such as visual modeling tools or 00 frameworks that serve as the basis for multiple data items. 
Summary
While new software technologies may offer the promise of exciting development efficiencies and capabilities, those technologies also may present serious challenges to safety and certification. The existence of these challenges, however, may easily get lost under a deluge of promotional hype. For safety-critical systems, recognizing and solving these challenges is essential; otherwise, using the new technologies may inadvertently introduce safety hazards. As Glass has said, "[tlhere is a cost to learning new ideas. We must come to understand the new idea, see how it fits into what we do, decide how to apply it, and consider when it should and shouldn't be used" [ZO].
To this end, this paper presented an overview of a number of technical challenges to safely using OOT in an aviation application. These challenges span the life cycle processes specified in the RTCADO-178B guidelines. The list of challenges is certainly incomplete; however it provides a starting point for constructive debate about the true merits of OOT and for developing guidelines for how OOT should and shouldn't be used in aviation applications.
